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Article 5

THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
JUDITH H. BELLO, ESQ.*
If you listened to the NAFTA debate in the United States last year,
you might mistake it as simply an agreement about jobs. Jobs are very
important and I am prepared to make the case that NAFTA will in
effect create jobs in Mexico, the United States and Canada. Yet I think
we will all readily agree that NAFTA is about much more than just
jobs. NAFTA has overarching implications that extend far beyond its
job effects.
First, I stress that the U.S.-Mexico aspect of NAFTA exemplifies a
reciprocal, mutually advantageous cooperation between a developed and
a developing country. This is a critical issue with respect to NAFTA and
an important component for NAFTA's implementation by the United
States. The global arena in which NAFTA occurs is very much a postCold War world. The focus will no longer be so exclusively East-West,
but increasingly will be returning to North-South. NAFTA is a good
news story that shows how the developing and developed worlds can
cooperate with each other to their mutual benefit.
Second, NAFTA will encourage global as well as regional trade liberalization. We probably would not have been able to conclude the
Uruguay Round of GATT talks in December 1993 if NAFTA had been
defeated. Moreover, many of the GATT contracting parties appreciate
that if we cannot liberalize world markets through a multilateral forum
such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (soon to be rechristened the World Trade organization), those who most ardently champion trade liberalization will seek to do so whichever way they canplurilaterally, bilaterally or otherwise.
Third, NAFTA establishes for the first time, a truly world-class legal
regime for protecting intellectual property. It is important to give credit
to Mexico, which unilaterally improved its protection of intellectual property prior to obtaining any reciprocal concessions by the United States.
Even so, NAFTA enshrines these unilateral reforms in a trilateral agreement and is the first agreement to create a comprehensive, truly firsttier system for protecting intellectual property.
Fourth, NAFTA clearly opens the door to closely integrating the treatment of trade, labor, and environmental issues. Fifth, NAFTA symbolizes
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what is happening, whether we like it or not, in the post-Cold War era:
the internationalization of the domestic agenda. Issues that we once
thought of as internal, political, or domestic are no longer the case in
the modern global economy connected by information highways, 24 hour
news reporting, and jets that criss-cross the world.
Finally, NAFTA serves to cement the historic, much-improved new
relationship between Mexico and the United States. These overarching
implications were often disregarded by NAFTA opponents who would
have had the United States reject NAFTA simply on the claim (which
of course the facts do not support) that NAFTA will cause that giant
"sucking sound" of jobs from the United States to south of the border.
With all this great promise, NAFTA still faced strong opposition in
the Congress of the United States. This opposition was due to many
factors, but I would like to place the issue in a geo-political context.
During the last presidential election, then-President Bush and his team
were able to conclude the negotiation of NAFTA-an immense achievement for that administration-and Governor Clinton was called upon to
take a position with respect to it. Meanwhile, Ross Perot had already
taken a strongly anti-NAFTA position.
Governor Clinton apparently was urged by some of his political advisors
to take the Perot line. At that point, Democratic polls showed that
Clinton needed only two of three states in order to clinch the election.
The three states at issue-Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania-are staunchly
anti-NAFTA states. It must have been tempting to take the prize readily
within his grasp by taking the Perot line in opposition to NAFTA. But
Governor Clinton, to his great credit, did something far more responsible;
albeit with great qualifications, he endorsed NAFTA because he appreciated that it is overwhelmingly in the best interests of the United States.
He also had other political interests at that time and it was not within
these interests to endorse NAFTA without qualification. A blanket endorsement would have been too great a pat on the back for President
Bush. Therefore, in Raleigh, North Carolina, on October 4, 1992, Governor Clinton said he would support NAFTA provided he first improved
it.I
Once elected, President Clinton made two fundamental miscalculations.
First, Clinton misjudged how long it would take to "improve" NAFTA
through the negotiation of the side accords. This was after all, a negotiation with two sovereign states-Mexico and Canada-who did not
regard the United States proposals as improvements. Therefore, it took
twice as long to conclude those negotiations than the administration
initially calculated.
Second, the Clinton Administration miscalculated the nature of this
foreign policy exercise. It was a mistake to assume that NAFTA would
pass in the same way as prior bills implementing trade agreements ne-

1. Mitchell Locin, Clinton Gives Trade Pact a Conditional OK,
at 5.
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gotiated by the United States have passed. The administration did not
anticipate the change in the geo-political sea in foreign policy-making.
In the past, the American public freely delegated to a very small group
of elites the power to make foreign policy for the United States. The
simple explanation for this is the conduct of the Cold War. Many
Americans recall civil defense drills in elementary school; the civil defense
siren would sound and everyone would crouch under the school desksas if they provided shelter against Soviet missiles. Nikita Khrushchev
pounded his shoe on the table and reminded us that the intent and design
of the Soviet Union was to bury the United States of America.
In this bipolar Cold War environment, overshadowed by the possibility
of nuclear annihilation, the general public was readily prepared to trust
the leader of the western world to establish foreign policy for the United
States. The president of the United States relied on the elites-"the
Establishment." It was a very small group dominated by East Coast Ivy
Leaguers who made foreign policy for this country, which the public
supported largely without question, out of fear of the Soviet menace
(with one notable exception: the Vietnam War). While the world is a
better place now that the Soviet Union-United States confrontation is
over, we can appreciate that the world is still a very dangerous place.
Yet, with the demise of the Soviet threat, many Americans are no longer
willing to delegate to the elite policy makers the determination of what
the foreign policy of the United States ought to be. The sea change in
attitudes about foreign policy is driven also by the breakdown of a clear
division between international and domestic policies; the internationalization of the domestic agenda that I discussed earlier. While NAFTA
did not cause this attitudinal sea change in foreign policy making, it
personifies the change.
Furthermore, the Clinton Administration did not understand that it
had to do something that predecessor administrations, Republican and
Democratic, did not have to do. That is, the Clinton Administration had
to convince the public of NAFTA's importance to this country. It seems,
however, President Clinton felt he could not fully support NAFTA until
it was his NAFTA. It was not his until it was "improved" by Clinton,
which took until September 1993.
Like nature, politics abhors a vacuum. When President Clinton did
not fully support" NAFTA on the Hustings, z NAFTA opponents made
the case against it. Among the opponents were organized labor, Ross
Perot, Pat Buchanan, Jesse Jackson, and the Black caucus. Ross Perot
is clearly a political genius. While I believe he has used NAFTA to
achieve negative results, Perot perceived that there was pervasive insecurity
among the American people, regarding NAFTA. Perot recognized this

2. The President gave his support to NAFTA, provided it was improved, in a major address
in February 1993. Split Goal on Trade; President's Speech Tries to Reconcile Open Markets with
Help for Industry, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 27, 1993, at 6. However, neither he nor his administration
undertook a marketing effortto sell NAFTA to the public beyond the Washington, D.C. beltway.

U.S.-MEXICO LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 2

insecurity and, to paraphrase his general argument, asked, "Do you agree
with me that America is in danger of decline? Do you share my concern
that our children and grandchildren will not necessarily have a better
life as we did? Well, it is NAFTA's fault." This argument is a complete
non sequitur, but nonetheless it appealed to a large number of Americans
who had not in the past paid much attention to foreign policy, and
particularly to NAFTA.
The Agreement went into effect, as scheduled, on January 1, 1994.3
Government agencies of the United States and Mexico issued interim
rules to implement NAFTA, at least on a temporary basis. Both also
sought public comments on proposed rules regarding NAFTA. 4 NAFTA
"Help" telephone assistance was offered to perplexed importers and
exporters, who in the transition period had difficulty understanding or
even obtaining copies of the new tariff schedules and customs-related
forms.
Currently, Canada, Mexico and the United States are devoted to providing resources to implement NAFTA with success. For example, commissions have been established among governments to assist in the
implementation process.
Surely, there will be problems and setbacks. While integrating the North
American market, each member government retains national interests that
can conflict with those of the other members. Moreover, NAFTA's
opponents are unlikely to fade away. Indeed, as Washington Post cartoonist Herblock predicted on November 18, 1993 (the day after the
passage of NAFTA implementing legislation by the United States House
of Representatives) NAFTA is likely to be blamed for job loss, loss of
income, business loss, loss in poker games, loss of luggage on plane
trips, loss of socks in laundry, loss of hair, loss of air in tires, burnt
toast, no cold beer, and any other malady imaginable.
NAFTA is strong enough to withstand such assaults. As the Agreement
yields dividends for each member government's national interests, including the overarching implications discussed above and, of course, jobs,
such assaults will diminish over time. The history books of tomorrow
will present NAFTA as a big step forward for all North Americans and
perhaps, indeed, the world.
QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS
QUESTION, Frederick Hill, Los Angeles: With respect to the trilateral
commissions that have been set up by the NAFTA side accords, how
can we address the criticism that these commissions will simply create
more bureaucracy?

3. With respect to United States implementation, see Proclamation To Implement the North
American Free Trade Agreement, and for Other Purposes, 58 Fed. Reg. 66,867 (1993).
4. See, e.g., United States Customs Service North American Free Trade Agreement Interim
Regulations, 58 Fed. Reg. 69,460 (1993); Rules for Determining the Country of Origin of a Good,
59 Fed. Reg. 110 (1994).
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ANSWER, Ms. Bello: My own view is that there is too much government
bureaucracy. Having said that, I think it is necessary for the implementation of NAFTA in this country, and I think NAFTA is crucial for all
the reasons that I have already given. I also think that one can make
too much of the new bureaucracy that will be established. I do not
believe the commissions are going to function as runaway, unaccountable,
supernational bureaucracies. They have been carefully reigned in by the
drafting of the NAFTA side accords.
QUESTION, Tom Schernbaum, University of Georgia: You made the
statement that NAFTA will encourage global agreements as well as regional
trade agreements, which implies that NAFTA will have a positive impact
on the GATT multi-level trading system. Can you reconcile this impact
with some of the more protectionist elements of NAFTA that have not
been mentioned this morning. For example, I am speaking about the
rules of origin, the yarn forward rule of origin, which is understandable
from a political standpoint but not from an economic standpoint. The
general rule of origin under NAFTA, which is the change and customs
classification rule, is a tremendous advance over the substantial transformation test. But added to that rule in certain sectors, such as autos,
are North American domestic content rules, which amount to 62.5070 for
automobiles and auto parts. Moreover, the Clinton Administration used
Japan as the scapegoat to sell NAFTA. I would like your comment on
this.
ANSWER, Ms. Bello: Your question allows me to elaborate on a point
that I really did not mention earlier. I would not call the rules of origin
in NAFTA protectionist, but stringent. There is a political reality we
have to recognize: the United States, Mexico, and Canada all want to
make sure that the benefits of NAFTA are received by North Americans
and are not exploited by non-North Americans. Whether for better or
worse, it was politically necessary to have some of these stringent rules.
In fact, the yarn forward rule is generous compared to the fiber forward
rule. According to the latter, if the cotton is not grown in North America,
nothing made from it is entitled to NAFTA tariff benefits. I agree that
this is an example of a stringent rule. These rules, however, are still
allowed by GATT because it is important to promote a free trade area.
In response to the second question you posed, a Japanese government
official reportedly remarked that NAFTA was "sneaky protectionism." '
NAFTA will have some trade diversionary effects and, in the short term,
this will not be good for non-North Americans. But if NAFTA fails,
then United States leadership on trade liberalization also fails. If that
happens, it is much less likely that multilateral trade liberalization will
occur because it has always been led by the United States. Politically
speaking, trading partners such as Japan who are legitimately concerned

5. Michael K. Fisby, Clinton's Crusade for NAFTA Includes Arm-Twisting, Citing Threats to
U.S., WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 1993, at A24.
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about NAFTA's likely short-term trade diversionary effects want NAFTA
to succeed.
QUESTION, Joanne Stark, Phoenix, Arizona: The Canada-United States
Free Trade Agreement opened up certain business immigrant visa possibilities for Canada. The Bush Administration attempted to downplay
the immigration implementing provisions in NAFTA because of the mounting paranoia regarding labor issues. What is your view of the immigration
components of NAFTA?
ANSWER, Ms. Bello: NAFTA is not fundamentally an agreement on
the movement of labor; it does not alter the immigration laws of any
of the three member governments. There are some useful-yet modestprovisions on the temporary entry of business persons, which will make
it easier for investors, traders, sellers, and other business persons to have
easy entrance into North American countries.
That possibility has provoked some concern. NAFTA allows up to6
5,500 Mexican professionals entrance into the United States annually.
In my judgment, it is quite a modest provision but, nonetheless, has
provoked some concern. For example, the American Medical Association
has raised questions regarding whether or not unqualified Mexican professionals will be allowed to practice medicine in the United States.

6. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., app. 1603(D)(4)(1)
H.R. Doc. No. 103-159 (effective Jan. I, 1994).

